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The disciplinarity of science and the future of interdisciplinarity in science is deeply 
connected with understanding the scope of scientific practice as well as the demarcation and 
organization of scientific disciplines. These topics, explored through the structure of their 
subjects, theories, methods, and interpretation, lead to the conclusion that science and its 
disciplines are largely defined by the integration of philosophical principles into the ethos of the 
practices rather than by any specific criteria. The ways in which different disciplines behave and 
interpret philosophies impact how those disciplines are organized and categorized, resulting in 
deep philosophical and perspective divides between disciplines. As a result of these conclusions, 
it can be asserted that interdisciplinary research faces many challenges. To combat the discipline 
divides, careful consideration of the philosophical discipline differences and the limited 
perspective of individual disciplines is required. Additionally, interdisciplinary research might 
consider viewing the disciplines as philosophically and socially unique, as well as equally valid 
and scientific, in order to effectively collaborate on interdisciplinary science and continue 





Science has been separated into categories or disciplines throughout its history1. The 
structure of this categorization has taken many forms and the disciplinarity of science has 
changed with the behaviors and beliefs of scientists and institutions. Through these historical 
changes some traditional and colloquial disciplines have emerged in a modern conception of 
science. These disciplines as well as many and various subdisciplines engage with their unique 
history forming distinct practices and viewpoints. Disciplines’ study different subjects, postulate 
different theories, utilize different methods, and engage in different metaphysical interpretations. 
Exploration of these disciplines - their function, nature, and historical context - can impact the 
deeper questions of knowledge, application, and future study. The central questions that this 
paper attempts to answer are: what is the function of disciplines in science and what is the impact 
of disciplinarity on the future of interdisciplinary research.  
The Vector of Science 
Scientific inquiry often involves knowledge being catalogued and inquiry being 
perpetuated through time with each experiment or study creating new questions for science to 
explore. Thus, one is led to wonder about the impact of scientific disciplines and of philosophy 
on future questions, insights, and results. This will, henceforth, be referred to as the vector of 
science. This metaphor will be used throughout this paper to address the conception of science 
not as a stagnant, singular action, but instead as a temporal, impacted practice. The vector of 
science is impacted by not only the philosophies applied, but by the subjects, theories, and 
 
1 Horacio Capel, “The History of Science and the History of the Scientific Disciplines.,” 
Universidad de Barcelona, December 1989, http://www.ub.edu/geocrit/geo84.htm. 
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methodologies involved. The vector of science is the exploration of what the future of science 
will look like given a particular set of philosophical circumstances. 
The vector of science contains certain aspects which will assist in conceptualizing the 
perpetuation of science through time, not as a simple cause and effect, but as a regularly updating 
directionality of continuation. Vectors have both a magnitude and a direction and, by extension, 
the vector of science metaphor would also contain elements of magnitude and direction.  
The magnitude of the vector of science indicates the energy, prolificacy, and regularity 
with which science is likely to continue. In other words, how prevalent and relevant are new 
questions and new experiments being proposed and executed? There could be many reasons for a 
kind of stalled vector of science or a vector with a low magnitude including philosophical and 
technological impasses. Science, as shall be shown, has not moved through time with predictable 
and regularly scheduled discoveries and many thinkers have observed this phenomenon2. Thus, 
the magnitude of the vector of science directly addresses the ebbs and flows, stuttered starts and 
accelerations, and even the retreating steps of scientific movement through time in a future 
oriented context. It highlights the prediction that science will continue to resist consistent 
discovery scheduling moving forward.  
Direction in the vector of science refers to the trend toward particular ideas, goals, and 
pursuits. Two concepts are able to describe the direction of the vector of science. First, the 
directional next refers to actions in the direction of the vector in the immediate future. Second, 
the trajectory of science refers to actions or conclusions in the direction of the vector as an end 
result. The directional next asks which types of questions are being proposed and what possible 
 
2 Panel on Mathematics (Nonlinear Science and the Navy) et al., Nonlinear Science 
(Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997). 
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studies could be pursued in this directional space? The answers to these questions form the 
concept that will thus be called the directional next. The directional next is the set of specific 
inquiries, actions, and behaviors a scientist might follow as a result of a particular work or 
situation – a set of possible work in the direction of the vector. On the other hand, the trajectory 
of science asks where science will end up? Following the direction of the vector, any conclusions 
or predicted changes to the vector of science and the path through which these conclusions 
would be achieved will thus be called the trajectory of science. Examples of predicted 
trajectories of science are that science will be defined by a finite set of fundamental laws or that 
all scientific theories will be reducible to a single theory. These are broad sweeping conclusions 
to which a particular vector could point. The vector of science does not always provide a clear 
directional next nor does it always imply a specific trajectory of science. Instead, these are ways 
of conceptualizing the direction of the vector of science.  
This paper is fundamentally about the impact of scientific disciplines on this perpetuation 
of science through time. Through this exploration, one may wonder about the singularity of the 
vector of science. If, as will be the conclusion of this paper, individual disciplines apply 
philosophical principles distinctly, have different beliefs and expectations surrounding the future 
of their inquiry, and often work on independent theories and conclusions, there may be room for 
the application of this vector metaphor on each discipline independently. This concept will be 
referred to as the vector of a particular discipline (i.e., the vector of chemistry). These vectors of 
particular disciplines will have their own magnitudes and directions which will indicate the ways 
those disciplines will continue through time. While it may be useful at times to understand the 
vector of science as a singular entity, it may be a more robust conclusion to understand the 
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perpetuation of science through time as entirely more disciplinary with multiple vectors 
impacting one another. 
Structures and Assertions 
This paper contains two main exploratory sections. First, there is the exploration of what 
demarcates science from other forms of thought and other practices. Second, there is the 
exploration of what demarcates different disciplines of science from one another and how those 
disciplines might be organized. These first two sections involve analyzing the relevant topic 
according to the subjects studied, the theories postulated, the methods employed, and the 
interpretation involved: analyzing each in turn. First, this paper explores the subjects of inquiry – 
from ducks to dark matter to deities. Which thinkers are tasked with the investigation of these 
subjects? Then, this paper explores the nature of theories – from explanation to connection to 
application. What questions and postulates direct research and reflect current understanding? 
Then, this paper explores the methods of inquiry – from dependent variables to derivations to 
declarations. What are the procedures and rules that distinguish scientific thinkers? Finally, this 
paper explores the interpretations and disseminations – from journals to journeys to jumbles. 
What beliefs, benefits, and bargains does metaphysical interpretation dictate?  
The conclusions drawn from these explorations on scientific demarcation and on 
discipline demarcation inform the broader impact disciplines may have on the vector of science 
and how individual discipline vectors may behave. The conclusion is the investigation of 
interdisciplinarity in science as it relates to the frameworks previously discussed. Conclusions 
from the preceding sections inform conclusions about interdisciplinarity and the unique 
challenges presented by the disciplines on interdisciplinary research. Specifically, it is shown 
that in the space of academia where much science is conducted there are procedures which can 
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bridge the divides between disciplines including awareness of differences (comparability), 
acceptance of equality of approaches (parity), and deliberate collaboration on interdisciplinary 
science (synergy). 
Science is a complex, powerful, and diverse practice. Disciplinarity within that practice 
reflects the complexity of the topic based on the desire to sort and catalogue scientific discovery. 
Science is often considered the authority on truth and fact. At the very least, it is regularly 
applied to everyday experiences and life-altering events. Science is revered and respected as an 
honest mechanism for prediction, explanation, and even comfort. Thus, understanding the ways 
in which it continues through time and optimizing its disciplinarity has immediate consequences 
for science itself and society as a larger whole. Beyond the impact of science itself, 
interdisciplinarity is a popular topic in science today with many universities and scientists 
advocating for more interdisciplinary work34. However, there are a number of challenges with 
interdisciplinarity which derive from the construction and function of disciplines in science5. 
Thus, science, disciplines, and interdisciplinarity are interconnected and impactful ideas for the 
future of scientific research. This is the main focus of this paper – the understanding of 
disciplines in scientific work and their impact on the future of science.  
Science, as shall be shown, is a somewhat culturally defined practice with many of its 
ethos tied to, but not defined by, specific behaviors and philosophies. Understanding the function 
 
3 Elisabeth Pain, “Multidisciplinary Research: Today's Hottest Buzzword?,” Science, 
January 3, 2003, https://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2003/01/multidisciplinary-research-
todays-hottest-buzzword. 
4 Michelle Appleby, “What Are the Benefits of Interdisciplinary Study?,” OpenLearn 
(The Open University, March 1, 2019), https://www.open.edu/openlearn/education/what-are-the-
benefits-interdisciplinary-study. 
5 Miles MacLeod, “What Makes Interdisciplinarity Difficult? Some Consequences of 




of disciplines within a scientific system remains a treacherous task with minimal resolution as 
disciplines are similarly defined by their social ethos rather than strict philosophical criteria. 
However, the explorations of both science itself and scientific disciplines are important 
precursors to understanding the challenges with interdisciplinary research. Interdisciplinary 
research encounters roadblocks because of the ways that science and scientific disciplines are 
constructed. Interdisciplinary research, without careful consideration of the philosophical 
divides, are rarely able to address the differences in disciplines’ subjects, theories, methods, and 
interpretation. To mitigate deep philosophical and metaphysical divides between disciplines in 
their pursuit of interdisciplinarity, the disciplines might work on their comparability, parity, and 
synergy. The perpetuation of science through time, the vector of science, is influenced and 
driven by the philosophy and context of science; each action and belief in science impacts the 
science that will be done next and on through time. Thus, the operation of disciplines and the 
measured pursuit of interdisciplinarity has a significant impact on the vector of science providing 
the context for scientific progression. The conclusions of the fundamental questions of scientific 







This first section focuses on the scientific demarcation problem which traditionally 
attempts to separate science from pseudoscience; however, a broader scope is applied here. 
Rather than focusing on the two major criteria of pseudoscience, which, according to Hansson, 
requires that a practice 1) not be science, and 2) attempt to give the impression that it is science6, 
this section only explores the first criteria. In other words, this section explores the distinguishing 
features between science and non-science. Specifically, what distinguishes scientific subjects 
from non-scientific subjects, what distinguishes scientific theories from non-scientific theories, 
what distinguishes scientific methods from non-scientific methods, and what distinguishes 
scientific interpretation from non-scientific interpretation.  
Many thinkers who have explored the demarcation question look for distinguishing 
criteria that are necessary, in that all science must necessarily follow this criterion, and sufficient, 
in that no other criteria are needed to properly distinguish science from non-science7. However, 
no consensus on this necessary and sufficient criterion is established. Therefore, a thorough 
exploration of the relevant thinkers on the subject is necessary to understand what distinguishes 
science. Sometimes thinkers did not make sweeping statements on what was and was not 
science; instead, they pondered on the nature of science wherein one might find distinguishing 
characteristics. These analyses too will be explored as they have implications for the demarcation 
problem. 
 
6 Sven Ove Hansson, “Defining Pseudoscience and Science,” in Philosophy of 
Pseudoscience: Reconsidering the Demarcation Problem (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2013). 
7 Martin Mahner, “Demarcating Science from Non-Science,” General Philosophy of 
Science, 2007, pp. 515-575, https://doi.org/10.1016/b978-044451548-3/50011-2. 
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Understanding what distinguishes science from other practices achieves a couple of goals 
for determining the structure and function of disciplines in science. First, distinguishing science 
helps to define the scope of the problem as scientific disciplines generally exist within 
established scientific practice. Second, discussion of the demarcation problem for science itself 
provides a framework of philosophies and concepts for the demarcation and understanding of 
individual disciplines. Overall, distinguishing science from other activities is a tremendously 
common starting place for many thinkers and will assist in introducing the philosophies with a 
great impact on the behaviors of science and scientific disciplines. 
What makes a scientific subject of study? 
If a scientist is setting out to conduct science, what are the subjects of their study? For 
many approaches to the question of demarcation which will be discussed throughout this paper, 
science can, in principle, study anything as long as it is studied in a scientific way. This is to say 
that many interested in this question of scientific demarcation cite criteria based on theoretical, 
methodological, and interpretation aspects rather than physical ones (each of which will be 
covered in the next few sections). From a historical rather than philosophical perspective, the 
scientific community and society as a whole dictated what types of subjects can be studied under 
the heading of science. For example, religion studies deities and religious texts, and while many 
philosophers of science made claims about the existence of God, religion is generally categorized 
outside of the scope of science. Thus, a kind of tautology is formed - science studies whatever 
scientists choose to study. Science studies trees and quarks as well as ocean waves and heat. This 
diversity often subverts clear categorization. However, one may attempt to parse and pattern the 




Derived from principles expressed by Carnap, for example, one may come to the 
conclusion that science studies theoretical and observable objects and phenomena. To begin, one 
can uncontroversially say that science studies objects that are observable. While observable 
linguistically implies the use of the eyes, the other senses have been employed in scientific study. 
Carnap described observations as those unaided by technical instruments or inferences8. 
However, because science is a mechanism of explanation rather than just observation, it can be 
said that science also studies phenomena9. For example, science can study humans, an object, 
and it can study human behavior, a phenomenon. Therefore, it may be concluded that science can 
study observable objects and phenomena. Observability is thus a candidate for the common link 
among subjects that science studies; however, with improvements in technology more objects 
and phenomena can be observed - those that are smaller and further away. While these would not 
be considered observable according to Carnap, as they require technical instruments to observe, 
they nonetheless rely, though enhanced, on the five senses to observe. Thus, the criteria may be 
expanded to include objects and phenomena that are observable either aided or unaided as no one 
would deny that organelles and distant galaxies, for instance, fall under the jurisdiction of 
science. Furthermore, some of the subjects that science studies are those which rely almost 
exclusively on technology to observe requiring specific materials and software to detect. These 
kinds of technologies do not merely enhance the five senses, instead a scientist is observing a 
signal from a screen and not the objects themselves. This is so far removed from the idea of 
direct observation that Carnap described as these observations require both instruments and 
 
8 Rudolf Carnap, “Theories and Nonobservables,” in Philosophical Foundations of 
Physics (Basic Books Inc., 1966). 
9 National Academies of Sciences, “Scientific Methods and Knowledge,” in 




interpretation. Carnap viewed such detections as theoretical rather than observational. For 
example, one may observe that the liquid in a thermometer rises, but the phenomenon of 
temperature change is theoretical10. Following this line of thinking, electrons and 
electromagnetic waves which cannot be directly observed, only detected, are technically 
theoretical. Once again, not many would deny that these theoretical objects and phenomena still 
fall under the jurisdiction of science. Therefore, the subjects of scientific inquiry, using this 
language, are observable and theoretical objects as well as observable and theoretical 
phenomena.  
This criterion is so broad as to be not particularly compelling. For instance, one may 
claim that divine intervention, a traditionally religious and not scientific subject of study, is a 
theoretical phenomenon. Upon adding increasingly abstract subjects to the scientific repertoire 
and distancing these subjects from the five senses, there is not complete consensus on which and 
how certain scientific subjects exist. Thus, this may be a necessary but not sufficient criteria for 
scientific demarcation. Nonetheless, this exploration and categorization of scientific subjects has 
significant implications for discipline demarcation and interdisciplinarity. While there are not 
necessary and sufficient criteria nor much discussion for distinguishing science on the basis of 
subjects, there is quite a bit of discourse in other areas wherein interesting truths about science 
may be revealed. The next section will explore the distinguishing of science based on the 
theories it employs. 
 
10 Rudolf Carnap, “Theories and Nonobservables,” in Philosophical Foundations of 
Physics (Basic Books Inc., 1966). 
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What makes a scientific theory? 
If a scientist is setting out to conduct science, what do their theories look like? To 
understand the context of the discussion surrounding the demarcation of science based on 
theories, one should discuss some of the major historical proposals for this kind of demarcation. 
With each approach to this question, the definition of theory stretches and morphs. The concept 
of a theory as a possible explanation for phenomena, anomalies, and observations has taken 
different names and had has been defined by different fundamental properties. Thus, during this 
discussion the definition of a scientific theory will adapt and its definitional formation is a kind 
of demarcation itself. It is true that many of these attempts to demarcate science remain 
impactful to the ethos and behavior of science today even if the proposals are not widely 
accepted anymore. 
The Logical Positivist in the early 20th century tried to standardize scientific behavior 
and in doing so proposed a theoretical demarcation on the basis of verificationism11. This is the 
principle that a scientific theory is one that can be verified using a finite set of observations.  
This was considered a criterion for meaning and subsequently undermined itself12. However, the 
principles of collecting empirical data to support a scientific theory has lived on beyond the 
logical positivists13. This model, proposed by the Vienna Circle, suggested that theories are 
useful tools as long as they are grounded in observations which support them, but theories alone 
are not enough to be considered science.  
 
11 Samir Okasha, “Verificationism, Realism and Scepticism,” Erkenntnis 55, no. 3 
(2001): pp. 371-385. 
12 Jonathan Surovell, “Carnap's Response to the Charge That Verificationism Is Self-
Undermining,” PhilSci Archive, March 14, 2013, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9629/. 
13 Jonathan Surovell, “Carnap's Response to the Charge That Verificationism Is Self-
Undermining,” PhilSci Archive, March 14, 2013, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9629/. 
13 
 
Popper is arguably one of the most influential philosophers who distinguished science 
purely by theoretical demarcation. He was reacting to principles of verificationism and to 
research he believed to be pseudoscientific occurring at the time. Popper believed the only 
sufficient and necessary criteria needed to determine science from non-science is that of 
falsification. A particular theory was scientific if and only if it was testable and refutable14. 
Popper compared Einstein's theory of gravitation with other new theories being tested at the time 
including Freudian Psychology. Instead of confirming his theory by multitudes of positive 
evidence surrounding him, as Freud did, Einstein waited to make a prediction which was testable 
and could prove his theory wrong. Thus, according to Popper, Einstein’s theory is falsifiable and 
testable, and therefore constituted science rather than non-science. Popper was criticized a 
number of times for various inconsistencies with his criterion including the belief that 
falsification as a strict theoretical concept has itself been falsified15. The practice of falsification 
has more often been applied to the formation of hypotheses rather than all-encompassing 
theories. As a part of scientific behavior, almost all scientists with an experimental view of 
science require a testable, falsifiable hypothesis. Thus, falsification lives on in scientific practice. 
Kuhn was another thinker who changed the way science viewed itself and postulated 
theories. His historical analysis of science led to different conclusions on what constitutes a 
scientific theory. For Kuhn, a paradigm was a broad scientific theory that was not directly 
falsifiable in most everyday science (Kuhn’s normal science)16. Instead of following the 
 
14 Karl Raimund Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (Vienna: Logik der Forschung 
, 1935). 
15 Nicholas Maxwell, “A Critique of Popper's Views on Scientific Method,” Philosophy 
of Science 39, no. 2 (1972): pp. 131-152, https://doi.org/10.1086/288429. 
16 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1962). 
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Popperian ideal of perfectly formulated scientific theories, Kuhn suggested that new paradigms 
were accepted and rejected based on a number of guiding principles and that the ultimate 
decision was left up to the scientific community. The principles that the scientific community 
uses in times of revolution reflect the values of that community. Some of the principles that are 
possible priorities, according to Kuhn, are accuracy with data, internal and external consistency, 
broad scope, explanatory power, simplicity, and providing a clear and impactful next step17. 
Thus, a Kuhnian criteria for a scientific theory is one which the scientific community accepts 
based on the priorities they set. This is far less prescriptive than Popper’s criteria as well as being 
historically rather than philosophically defined.  
While most of the examples in Kuhn’s book were from physics and chemistry, Kuhnian 
ideas were readily adopted by many fields, especially social science. Fields like sociology, 
economics, and political science could meet requirements for being sciences18. Theories, 
according to Kuhn, did not need to follow any particular criteria, but had to instead be adopted 
by the discipline’s community. Thus, theories in these broader disciplines which couldn’t meet 
stringent verification or falsification criteria could behave in a Kuhnian manner and be 
considered scientific. Science became a broader category of behaviors and disciplines. Of course, 
this was not the first time that these disciplines could be considered science; however, it was an 
important distinction for the development of modern scientific consideration. It’s important to 
note that behaving in a Kuhnian manner is not a necessary or sufficient criterion for science, but 
 
17 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1962). 
18 W. Keith Percival, “The Applicability of Kuhn's Paradigms to the Social Sciences,” 
The American Sociologist 14, no. 1 (February 1979): pp. 28-31. 
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a framework to understand scientific behavior. Instead, Kuhn demarcated science by the 
conclusions of the scientific community19. 
After Kuhn published his book, others utilized the methods of historical analysis to 
formulate their own ideas about scientific inquiry. Specifically, Lakatos and Laudan responded 
to Kuhn’s ideas. Lakatos believed method and falsifiability still had major roles to play in the 
shifting of scientific paradigms which he called research programs. Research programs had a 
scientific theory or concept, known as the core which was the central theory of the research 
program with smaller falsifiable theories which, in some ways, insulate the core from 
falsification20. These outer theories and beliefs are known as the positive heuristics; they work 
within the research program and follow much more traditional and empirical views of scientific 
theorizing and methodology. This structure proposed a blending of criteria in scientific practice; 
thus, if a practice deviated too far from this theoretical structure it would be considered less 
scientific. Theoretical procedure and principle, in the Lakatosian view, still mattered in the 
conception and perpetuation of science. In other words, the vector of science would not be left 
solely to the scientific community.  
When it comes to postulating scientific theories, it follows that a scientist’s view on the 
goal of science will impact the types of theories they propose. These goal-driven implications on 
theories of science are not reaching for the necessary and sufficient criteria for which that 
demarcation question often searches; however, they impact the theory-based behavior of science 
and are worth exploring further. Specifically, there has been some debate on whether the goal of 
 
19 Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, IL: The University 
of Chicago Press, 1962). 
20 Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes Philosophical 
Papers, ed. John Worrall and Gregory Currie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 
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science is to create a complete picture of knowledge, or to solve problems and create 
applications21. A more pragmatic goal would postulate far more applicable theories while a more 
general goal would postulate theories relating to the gaps in the whole picture of the field. 
Agreeing on the goal of science would likely create theories of a more uniform nature, but 
would, as a demarcation criterion, likely exclude very important historical and future scientific 
work.  
Ziman along with other thinkers proposed a method of knowledge production which 
shifted the traditional goal of science in exactly this way. Specifically, the Mode-2 knowledge 
production, as it is known, focuses on industrial rather than academic science and is primarily 
focused on application2223. From a goal perspective, this is a framework for science with a more 
pragmatic goal. This theory is somewhat at odds with the normative beliefs of academic science 
and highlights the differences in scientific practice based on the fundamental goals of that 
science. 
Those criteria about theories which are philosophically rather than historically defined 
such as verificationism and falsifiability are not wholly accurate and applicable throughout 
scientific history for what is widely considered science2425. In order to avoid excluding these 
theories, these core principles and proposals could be considered normative statements. For 
 
21 Aboutorab Yaghmaie, “How to Characterise Pure and Applied Science,” International 
Studies in the Philosophy of Science 31, no. 2 (March 2017): pp. 133-149, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02698595.2018.1424763. 
22 Michael Gibbons et al., The New Production of Knowledge the Dynamics of Science 
and Research in Contemporary Societies (Los Angeles, CA: Sage, 1994). 
23 J. Ziman, Real Science: What It Is and What It Means (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
24 Jonathan Surovell, “Carnap's Response to the Charge That Verificationism Is Self-
Undermining,” PhilSci Archive, March 14, 2013, http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/9629/. 
25 Nicholas Maxwell, “A Critique of Popper's Views on Scientific Method,” Philosophy 
of Science 39, no. 2 (1972): pp. 131-152, https://doi.org/10.1086/288429. 
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example, instead of saying that those theories which are not falsifiable are not science, one may 
say that scientific theories should try to be falsifiable. Science, in modern practice, often takes 
these proposed criteria as normative statements and folds them into the goals and practices of 
science in order to be accepted and established within the scientific community. These 
statements and expectations also provide a descriptive framework to understand what scientific 
theories tend to look like.  
Scientific theories are not usually observed in isolation, however. Instead, these theories 
are deeply connected with the methods that certain belief systems performed. The next section 
will explore how thinkers have distinguished scientific methodologies from other procedures.  
What makes a scientific method? 
If a scientist sets out to conduct science, what methodological beliefs and practical methods do 
they utilize? Methodology and strategies employed by scientists in order to think about 
problems, collect data, and analyze data are far-ranging and powerful tools of demarcation.  
Throughout history, science and knowledge have been closely linked. Therefore, some of 
the demarcation criteria this section will explore will be tied directly to the question of what 
knowledge is and how it is achieved. This practice is called epistemology. It is therefore 
appropriate to wonder if the demarcation of science from other activities is the pursuit of 
absolute truth rather than an approximation, model, or other asymptotical conception of truth. 
Many thinkers conflated science with knowledge and therefore proposed an equivalency between 
the methodological strategies for distinguishing science with the methodological strategies for 
distinguishing knowledge, especially when those methods are philosophically rather than 
18 
 
historically defined26. For much of history science, as a practice, was somewhat indistinguishable 
from philosophy. Thus, inklings of scientific demarcation can be found within the philosophical 
debates surrounding knowledge and epistemology.  
An example of such an epistemic debate was that of rationalism and empiricism. The 
central epistemic conflict of this debate was whether people come to know the world through 
logic and thought, rationalism, or if people know the world through sense and experience, 
empiricism27.  
Some of the most famous rationalists were Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. Descartes 
utilized what he called the method of doubt in order to understand what is true about the world. 
He came to the conclusion that what is true is that which is “clearly and distinctly perceived”28. 
While there is some debate on interpreting these criteria, the conclusion by Descartes is fairly 
clear - the only truths that are fully clear and distinct are those derived from intellection and 
reasoning29. In other words, he excluded all imagination and sense perception from being fully 
clear and distinct and therefore from being certain. Thus, for the purposes of distinguishing 
science from other activities, his philosophy might be analyzed as the doubting of sense 
experience, the reliability of reason, and an emphasis on mathematics. Utilizing his ideas of true 
and certain facts he developed geometric proofs and even the cartesian coordinate system still in 
 
26 Carl J Wenning, “Scientific Epistemology: How Scientists Know What They Know,” 
Journal of Physics Teacher Education Online 5, no. 2 (2009): pp. 3-15. 
27 Peter Markie, “Rationalism vs. Empiricism,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Stanford University, July 6, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rationalism-empiricism/. 
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use today30. Rationalists, like Descartes, believed that knowledge was gained only through 
reason and logic and not through experience therefore science, if science is equivalent to 
knowledge, was not the practice of collecting sense data, but of reaching rational conclusions.   
The rationalist view of truth and certainty contrasted the views of the empiricists and 
specifically, the empirical view of epistemology. Again, for the purposes of scientific 
demarcation, the epistemological approach is highlighted.  Some of the most famous empiricists 
were Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Locke believed that all knowledge is derived from 
experience31.  Berkley argued that all qualities ascribed to objects exist only in perception32. Both 
these thinkers believed that all knowledge was derived from the perceptions or those qualities 
associated with the five senses; however, these perceptions did not necessarily reflect objective 
reality. This tradition of empiricism, known as British Empiricism, thought that one can only 
have knowledge of their own perceptions and not of the outside world itself 33. Thus, the 
inaccessibility of physical knowledge about the world implies an inaccessibility of science to say 
anything about reality. Therefore, science practiced through observation, would describe not 
what is, but only what is perceived.  
A kind of culmination of these discussions lives with the logical empiricists sometimes 
called the logical positivists. The differences between these labels reflect the diversity of thinkers 
within the broader movement. Logical empiricists rejected many rationalist beliefs because, as 
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the name implies, they were empiricists who believed that knowledge was only accessible 
through sense experience; however, their position differed slightly from that of the British 
empiricists. Sense experience, to the logical empiricists, could say something about objective 
reality or was the closest that science could get to the truth34. As previously mentioned, the 
logical positivists generally believed in verificationism requiring that all knowledge be 
confirmed by the senses, though not all logical empiricists shared this particular view. 
Mathematical conceptualizing, amoung most logical emiricists, would act as a tool to aid direct 
observation and does not provide any truth of its own35. As much as logical empiricism was a 
philosophical movement, it was also a cultural one with individual thinkers meeting in groups 
and institutes to discuss their ideas and concerns about scientific methodology. Thus, their views 
were fairly diverse and debated. Additionally, the movement channeled many of their beliefs into 
influencing scientific methodology at the time. This influence reflected their core beliefs of 
observation as the primary method of scientific behavior. Their success in influencing scientific 
methodology is reflected in their continued relevancy to modern science. 
These discussions so far have dealt with the broad, general methodological principles 
drawn from epistemic debates; however, practical considerations and direct procedures are 
equally important to scientific methodology. For this exploration, one cannot deny the impact of 
Bacon. Bacon proposed the scientific method most widely acknowledged today36. While he has 
had his critics, his clear criteria for scientific methodology cannot be ignored. Bacon believed 
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that science was systematic, organized, and relied on inductive reasoning. He rejected the 
entrenched Aristotelian views and proposed his new method for science. He is credited with 
influencing the European scientific revolution which would include the works of Newton. 
Bacon’s scientific method has maintained tremendous influence over the scientific community 
and scientific practice including introducing the procedure of the modern scientific experiment37. 
A truly methodological demarcation of science would insist upon a method that is systematic and 
doubts previous entrenchment. These criteria as well as the use of specific procedures is the 
demarcation criteria that Bacon proposed38. Further thinkers as well as scientists, in the course of 
their work, have developed and refined the types of scientific procedures that are accepted, 
especially with technological advances. However, Bacon’s principles remain at the forefront of 
all these standardized procedures. 
Throughout all these debates, most thinkers believed that science was defined by and 
demarcated by its methodology; the most prevailing belief was that method determined whether 
a person was conducting science or simply thinking about a subject. As was previously stated, 
many believed that science could study any subject as long as a scientific methodology was 
utilized - this is methodological demarcation. Kuhn and the historical thinkers that followed him 
did a lot, however, to minimize the importance of strict methodology in scientific practice by 
pointing to specific historical examples. No thinker was as controversial and central to the 
minimizing of method as Feyerabend. He wrote a book entitled Against Method39. He utilized 
historical arguments to indicate that no standard method would capture all the relevant and 
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important scientific discoveries of the past. He had a kind of radically individualistic view of 
science taking Galileo as his strongest historical example. Feyerabend’s premise was that all the 
methodological beliefs and criteria could not have led to Galileo’s laws of motion. These laws 
did not fit with other theories at the time, Galileo’s theory did not provide particularly more 
explanatory power than established theories, and Galileo’s theory contained anomalies with the 
data. Therefore, using almost every methodology conceivable it was simply irrational for Galileo 
to adopt this theory; however, Galileo changed science significantly and was, according to 
Feyerabend and many today, a great scientist. As a result, Feyerabend did not believe in a strict 
scientific method which could be applied to all science40. Thus, according to Feyerabend, science 
could not be defined by its methods. 
The final view of scientific method comes from sociology rather than philosophy or 
history. Specifically, Merton proposed a theory which numbers specific tenets that science 
attempts to live up to in order to be accepted as part of a social view of science – universalism. 
communality, disinterestedness, and organized skepticism. Two of the tenets have implications 
for scientific method. Merton believed that science should have disinterestedness. 
Disinterestedness is the principle of doing science without bias and for the sake of science itself 
rather than to serve some personal goal. Merton also believed that science should engage in 
organized skepticism which is the principle that all science is subject to scrutiny. This scrutiny 
can come in the form of peer review, logical skepticism, or reproducibility41. As an organized 
social group, scientists hold each other accountable under greater scrutiny than other activities. 
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These principles are, according to Merton, what distinguishes scientific methodology from other 
activities. Merton’s norms for scientific behavior drew their own reactions especially when 
thinking about science not as an epistemological practice but as a practical one42. However, 
Merton’s norms still have relevancy among the historical philosophical principles and their 
implementation in modern science. 
Scientific demarcation based on methodology remains one of the most popular and 
accepted demarcation criteria. A central question that arises from the discussion of demarcation 
based on method is whether science is chasing absolute truth, whether science is approaching 
and approximating absolute truth, or whether science is unable to make direct claims about 
absolute truth43. The answer to this question is not particularly easy to determine despite the 
enormous impact such an answer would have on the vector of science. Following broad 
principles or specific procedures cannot conclusively claim to be conduits to this elusive absolute 
truth. Claims about the objective truth of scientific inquiry are an example of scientific 
interpretation. In addition to reviewing the subjects, theories, and methods of science, it is 
important to explore the uniqueness of scientific interpretation. This is what the next section will 
cover.  
What makes a scientific interpretation? 
When it comes to scientific interpretation, the line between interpreting current science 
and theorizing for future science is often blurred. In fact, many thinkers have debated the 
question of whether science begins with observation and data collection then makes theoretical 
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conclusions from those observations, or if science begins with a theory which is then supported 
by observation and data collection44. These are, of course, oversimplifications of historical 
behavior in science. However, they reveal the central question in the exploration of scientific 
interpretation as separate from scientific theorizing and has many implications for scientific 
demarcation. Though, interpretation discussions generally do not attempt to find necessary and 
sufficient criteria for the distinguishing of science as interpretation generally follows after the 
traditional procedure of science. However, when viewed as a step in the larger scientific process 
and viewed with its close ties to future theories, one may see the distinguishing characteristics. In 
other words, interpretation is the mechanism of the perpetuation of science through time – an 
important component of the vector of science. Instead of viewing science as isolated studies and 
experiments, one can view a more holistic scientific procedure which involves interpretation as 
an essential step, regardless of whether it simply appears as theorizing for the next experiment or 
involves more complex behaviors.    
Logical positivism, as a philosophy, was deeply concerned with the removal of 
metaphysics from science. The principles of verificationism, when it is said to cover 
meaningfulness, suggest that questions of value, meaning, and unobservable phenomena, not 
only are excluded from scientific behavior, but are themselves meaningless45. However, logical 
positivism and logical empiricism belong to a social movement with many different thinkers. 
The members of the Vienna Circle, for instance, disagreed often about many big questions. 
However, they mostly agreed on the tenant of removing metaphysics from the practice of 
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science46. Under this model, scientific interpretation would not include metaphysical questions. 
By trusting the epistemological significance of the scientific method, these thinkers did not view 
interpretation, especially metaphysical interpretation, as a priority in scientific thought. To the 
logical empiricists, science began with theories as tools for guiding empirical scientific practice 
and, through this procedure, the results would largely speak for themselves47.  
While Popper’s early works on falsification advocated that the necessary and sufficient 
criteria for science was that scientific theories were falsifiable, he also provided some interesting 
insight into what makes an interpretation scientific. Specifically, he advocated that scientists, 
when faced with falsifying data, must abandon their theories. Popper was not the only one who 
advocated for the acceptance of evidence as a distinguishing criterion; however, he provided 
good examples on how acceptance of results might be difficult or counterintuitive in certain 
practices, especially those he viewed as unscientific48. Specifically, he criticized Marxists for 
constantly changing their theory to accommodate what Popper saw as falsifying data. True 
scientists, according to Popper, engaged in interpretation which accepted falsifying results as 
refutation of their theory and attempted to postulate a new falsifiable theory to test. Others 
criticized this view based on a number of points49; however, the value of acceptance of results 
remains central to scientific ethos and practice50. Like the logical empiricists, if narrow, specific, 
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and often mathematical theories were used, interpretation beyond confirming or disproving the 
theories was not necessary. Popper’s contribution to this conversation was the necessity of 
scientists to accept scientific results and abandon falsified theories. Thus, the demarcation 
criteria proposed was that science, unlike non-science, accepted evidence as interpretation.  
In both these contexts, continuation of method – question to data to next question – is the 
way in which science is perpetuated through time. The direction of research is largely linear in a 
progression from less knowledge to more knowledge. Thus, the trajectory of science progresses 
closer to some conclusionary truth. The magnitude of the vector according to this viewpoint is 
affected more by individual action and proximity to the conclusionary truths than by larger 
systemic changes in the scientific canon.  
However, viewing interpretation as synonymous with new theory assumes that evidence 
is objective, truthful, and indisputable. While logical empiricists believed in scientific 
objectivity, their critics explored the theory-ladenness of observation - the concept that 
observation, data, and evidence are influenced by the theory under which they are conducted. 
Certain arguments about theory-ladenness were influenced or proposed due to the findings and 
writings of Gestalt psychologists. Gestalt psychologists were exploring the nature and fallibility 
of human observation. They reported that top-down influences of beliefs, expectations, and 
knowledge can change one’s view of the same physical experience. In psychology, this is the 
widely accepted concept of the separation between sensation and perception. Fallacies and 
mistakes in observation, it must be noted, can be overcome with awareness, effort, and repeated 
exposure to induce what is known as a Gestalt shift - the ability to suddenly perceive previously 
missed stimuli and subsequently the ability to switch between one’s original perception and the 
27 
 
shifted perception51. These ideas of top-down or mental influences on perceptual experience 
were applied to scientific observation. Therefore, the modern view of theory-laden observation 
was born. Science is not necessarily unique in the ladenness of observation and interpretation in 
comparison with other human endeavors; however, philosophy of science, especially that of the 
logical empiricists, prized objectivity which may be rebutted by theory-ladenness52. Scientific 
observation alone may not be as objective as many believed nor would it be equivalent to 
interpretation. Instead of simply accepting the reality of results, theory-ladenness implies the 
necessity of unpacking the theory-laden observations through interpretation53. 
Kuhn, when exploring his ideas of scientific revolution, introduced the concept of 
incommensurability. Incommensurability is the idea that across paradigms there is no common 
measure, and the two paradigms cannot be directly compared as a result54. Kuhn wrote about 
incommensurability throughout his life reacting to criticism and commentary. These sections 
reflect mostly his early musings on the subject of incommensurability. Kuhn was a proponent of 
the theory-ladenness of observation. Theory-ladenness of observation is referred to as 
observational incommensurability. Reasonable individuals from different paradigms could look 
at the same object or phenomenon and come to different conclusions while still behaving in a 
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rational and scientific manner55. Thus, each scientist is engaging in interpretation of results rather 
than completely removing interpretation from scientific behavior – interpreting identical 
observations within their own paradigm.  
Additionally, Kuhn defined a methodological incommensurability which depended on the 
standards on which one judges normal science within a paradigm. Normal science, according to 
Kuhn, is the puzzle-solving science conducted within a paradigm which attempts to solve 
conceptual anomalies with the prevailing theory56. The interpretation of normal science and the 
specific anomalies it attempts to solve are different in each paradigm. In other words, the 
prevailing paradigm sets the standard through which normal science will be carried out. For 
example, action at a distance versus mechanistic action was a paradigm shift in physics. In the 
newer paradigm which allowed action at a distance, normal science did not spend time finding a 
mechanism of explanation for particular phenomena whereas this was a consistent source of 
anomalies in the mechanistic paradigm57. As previously discussed, the scientific community, 
according to Kuhn, chooses new paradigms based on certain values. There are many reasons why 
one paradigm is chosen over another, and these reflect the values of the scientific community. 
The standards of the winning paradigm are usually based on the values to which that theory 
holds. Thus, in this example, the action at a distance paradigm valued fitting to data and more 
often worked on anomalies where data were inconsistent while the mechanistic paradigm valued 
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explanatory power and thus focused on anomalies where there was no mechanistic explanation. 
The behaviors of normal science in each paradigm were not being measured on the same 
standards and thus, there is no metric for their direct comparison. This is Kuhn’s methodological 
incommensurability58. Once again, one can see the role of interpretation in science on a longer 
timeline which includes paradigm shifts and their different interpretations. According to Kuhn, 
scientific interpretation, much like scientific theory, is left up to the values and beliefs of the 
scientific community. 
Finally, Kuhn took issue with the logical empiricists attempts to put scientific work into a 
neutral, objective language. Such language did not, in Kuhn’s view, exist. He defined a semantic 
incommensurability as a failure of translation between the language and lexicon of one paradigm 
and that of a competing paradigm. The definitions were different between these different 
paradigms, but even more broadly this meant that the interconnected words and concepts they 
described carried different meanings between different paradigms. Kuhn used the example of the 
paradigm shift between Newtonian mechanics and relativity. In each paradigm, the definitions of 
words such as space, time, and mass were completely different and therefore statements of 
theory utilizing these words would have different meanings59. Furthermore, the 
interconnectedness of words and theory mean that simple translation between the theories is 
extremely difficult and translation to a language unconnected with any theory is impossible. 
Scientific interpretation is therefore somewhat incomparable across paradigms unless careful 
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consideration is paid to the semantic incommensurability. The process of ardent and challenging 
translation between paradigms suggests that interpretation requires acknowledgement of the 
larger paradigm in which science is working.  
Each of these types of incommensurability has faced its own criticisms and corrections60. 
However, Kuhn’s incommensurability challenges the view of a trajectory of science that 
approaches greater truth and builds upon itself. Scientific interpretation, in a Kuhnian model, 
does not simply build upon previous scientific results, but builds within the paradigm. Scientific 
interpretation, therefore, differs from paradigm to paradigm and no necessary and sufficient 
criteria can be established for all of science. 
Lakatos, in his response to Kuhn, added a new consideration for scientific interpretation. 
In a Lakatosian research program, interpretation is not just about how the new results fit into the 
prevailing research program, but also how they contribute to the status of the research program 
itself. Specifically, new results could be evidence of degeneration or progression of the research 
program itself and point to new anomalies within the research program61.  
Both Kuhn and Lakatos did not distinguish science from non-science with interpretation 
but highlighted the challenges with viewing observation and interpretation as equivalent. In this 
view, interpretation is an important step in the procedure of science and can determine whether a 
prevailing theory is accepted or rejected.  
In the context of the vector of science, Kuhn left the vector of science up to the scientific 
community where they would choose between a directional next of further puzzle-solving or of 
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scientific revolution62. The broader idea is that the trajectory of science is that of revolution 
rather that a strict progression from less knowledge to more knowledge. Lakatos introduces two 
important ideas for the vector of science - progression and degeneration. A progressive research 
program suggests a vector of science with active and interesting directional nexts involving 
solving the anomalies in the program, while a degenerating research program suggests a vector 
of science without a directional next or with only a small set of following questions63. Thus, this 
directly conceptualizes the notion of magnitude. However, it is important to note that some 
research programs can progress while other degenerate in parallel; thus, this Lakatosian 
conception of a vector’s magnitude applies to the vectors of individual research programs rather 
than to the vector of science as a whole. Post-Kuhnian philosophy of science proposes a 
trajectory of science which is strictly non-linear; science reaches conclusions in shifts and 
reevaluations.  
Finally, Merton’s sociological view of science and scientific practice has components 
which affect the notion of scientific interpretation. First, his principle of universalism, which is 
closely related to the logical empiricist view of objectivity, suggests that claims made in science 
must be held to consistent and impersonal criteria64. Interpretations must meet particular criteria 
of objectiveness before being accepted as science. However, this expectation is less related to the 
removal of metaphysics and more associated with the removal of personal and political biases. 
Second, his principle of communality which suggests that science should be commonly available 
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among the scientific community in a kind of common property. Interpretations and conclusions 
must be shared amongst other members of the scientific community. This communality would 
leave results open to greater scrutiny and alternative interpretations for which scientists must be 
prepared65.   
A sociological view of scientific practice generally reflects the ethos and goals of 
scientific consideration rather than philosophical certainty. Once again, one can note that even 
criteria that one might philosophically reject often becomes part of the scientific ethos. Merton, 
in many ways, makes normative the philosophical principles of other thinkers, as previously 
discussed. Instead of attempting to define what science is philosophically and logically, these 
principles suggest what science should be in order to be socially accepted. Thus, Merton’s 
analysis and other sociological views suggest that, once again, acceptable scientific interpretation 
is that which is acceptable within the community of science and within its social rules.  
Overall, the demarcation of science is not often approached from the perspective of 
scientific interpretation; however, in different philosophical models one can see that there are 
different approaches to the act of scientific interpretation. One may uniquely identify these 
interpretations in scientific practice regardless of whether a necessary and sufficient criterion is 
reached. Scientific interpretation is a unique mechanism for understanding the vector of science 
and thus, must be considered from various perspectives. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion that is reached through this discussion is that thinkers in science and 
philosophy of science do not agree on necessary and sufficient criteria to demarcate science from 
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other activities. Moreover, there is growing evidence that such criteria cannot exist when 
viewing past scientific behavior. This conclusion has profound effects on the vector of science 
through beliefs, behaviors, and values. A strict criterion, for instance, might provide explicit 
details for what comes next in science and where science is meant to go, but as individual 
philosophies which have an influence on the ethos of scientific behavior, they imply those 
unique beliefs upon the vector of science. Thus, this question of what science is by definition, 
principle, or lack thereof impacts what science will get done, how science will get done, and 
eventually how science will be perceived and applied regardless of the conclusion. 
Demarcating science from other behaviors is only one step in determining the function of 
disciplines in science. How different disciplines interact with and embody the various 
philosophical concepts discussed is essential to distinguishing them from one another and 
establishing their function in the overall concept of science. The language, approaches, and 
frameworks through which one explores science within a larger system of pursuits and behaviors 
are the very same as those one can use to explore how disciplines function within a scientific 
system. Regardless of how ill-defined the practice of science is, the approaches are still 
important to the question of the function of disciplines in science. The next section will explore 






After exploring what distinguishes science, one is left with many questions regarding the 
influence of disciplines on these concepts and, inversely, the influence of these concepts on 
disciplines. Disciplines appear, on the surface, very different from one another because each has 
its own rich history and philosophical practices. Often disciplines study different subjects, 
postulate unique theories, employ distinct methods, and interpret their work differently. Even 
when they hold to congruent tenets, the disciplines reflect these tenets uniquely. Also, as 
previously discussed, no specific tenets or criteria are universally held in science. Thus, one is 
left to wonder if the apparent difference between disciplines is merely superficial, a reflection of 
the lack of a scientific criteria consensus, or an indication of deeper philosophical divides.  
A thorough exploration of the demarcation of disciplines from one another is central to 
understanding the function of disciplines, the nature of science, and the vector of science. 
Learning from the debates surrounding demarcating science from other activities, it is unlikely 
that there will emerge any necessary and sufficient criterion that distinguishes say physics from 
chemistry, thus, this paper will simply explore the philosophical differences without imposing 
strict demarcative criteria. There is also good reason to avoid creating definitions of disciplines 
as this would create an unhelpful, narrowing, view on the disciplines and their practices. Some 
examples of disciplines used throughout this paper are those of physics, chemistry, biology, and 
psychology; however, exploration will utilize other, more controversial, examples as well. 
For instance, it is important, at this point, to recognize the increasing specialization of 
scientific fields. This has many consequences in the understanding of science and its disciplines. 
One result of increased specialization is the development of subdisciplines and hybrid 
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disciplines. Take, for example, the field of physics. Instead of viewing physics as its own 
distinctive discipline, it may be more appropriate to view its subdisciplines and hybrid 
disciplines separately. In physics, there are subfields such as nuclear physics, material science, 
and quantum mechanics as well as hybrid disciplines such as biophysics and geophysics. In the 
exploration of what demarcates different disciplines from one another, one may find that 
subdisciplines and hybrid disciplines encounter the same demarcation challenges as the broader 
disciplines. 
Finally, there is a common practice to utilize philosophical and demarcation principles to 
group and organize disciplines. The grouping of certain disciplines reflects certain traits and 
behaviors which link these disciplines and inversely, separating disciplines reflect distinctions in 
their traits and behaviors. Furthermore, there has been much history surrounding the creation of 
hierarchies, webs, and other organization systems which may indicate or assume a particular 
philosophy. Thus, in addition to demarcating disciplines from one another, this section will 
indicate ways in which the philosophical, social, and historical practices of certain disciplines 
have placed them in certain groups and at certain locations in the organization of disciplines.  
With the broad principles of demarcation and organization laid out, one may proceed 
with the examination. Similar to the question of scientific demarcation, this exploration will 
utilize the categories of subjects, theories, methods, and interpretation. First, this section will 
explore the demarcation and organization of disciplines based on the subjects that each discipline 
studies. Second, this section will explore the demarcation and organization of disciplines based 
on the theories that each discipline postulates. Third, this section will explore the demarcation 
and organization of disciplines based on the methods that each discipline employs. Finally, this 
section will explore the demarcation and organization of disciplines based on the interpretations 
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that each discipline accepts. Each of these questions will be studied in turn, of course, utilizing 
the principles of the previous exploration of demarcating science. 
What subjects do disciplines study? 
While, as previously discussed, there are not many thinkers who distinguish science from 
other forms of thought by the subjects being studied, most disciplines are traditionally 
demarcated this way. In other words, science studies anything while individual disciplines study 
specific subjects. In fact, it is easy to see this as the essential component of discipline 
demarcation. Biology is the study of living things. Psychology is the study of behavior and 
mental processes. Chemistry is the study of the transformations of matter. However, these are 
almost definitional. Once again, one sees the same kind of tautology - scientific disciplines study 
whatever that subject was defined to study. This, however, does not provide any particular 
insight into the true distinctions between the disciplines. Additionally, because science is always 
changing and moving, the boundaries of the definitional criteria are often tested. Some 
disciplines share subjects, some subjects are not easily categorized into the disciplines, and these 
subjects may not account for some major differences between disciplines. One may see that 
under the seemingly simple demarcation based on the subjects of study, there are complications 
which are worth exploring.  
One might use the categories previously parsed based on Carnap’s view of observation, 
to come to the conclusion that disciplines differ and are organized by the level of abstraction of 
their definitional subjects of study66. The theory described four categories - observable objects, 
theoretical objects, observable phenomena, and theoretical phenomena. This theory is based on 
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the separation of particular types of detection from direct observation with the five senses67. In 
other words, the labels of observable and theoretical as well as objects and phenomena describe 
the level and type of abstraction through which a particular subject is detected. Theoretical 
subjects are separated from direct observation by inference and phenomenal subjects are 
separated from direct observation by connection. For example, the theoretical object of an 
electron cannot be directly observed by the five senses one must instead utilize and interpret 
technology designed to detect the presence of electrons. Thus, one makes a theoretical inference. 
Additionally, the phenomena of movement may be observed by the five senses but only after the 
connection of more than one observation of position is observed. It must be noted that much of 
this concept of abstraction is human-centric as the five senses are subject to human sensory 
limitations, thus defining how theoretical an object or phenomenon is, not by what it is, but by a 
human’s ability to observe it.  
Disciplines study subjects of differing degrees of abstraction from direct observation 
which may help to describe the definitional differences. Take, for example, the disciplines of 
psychology and human biology; both of these disciplines study the observable object of human 
beings. However, psychology is defined as studying behavior and mental processes68 which are 
not observable objects at all but rather phenomena. To almost certainly oversimplify, behavior is 
an observable phenomenon while mental processes are theoretical phenomena. Thus, 
subdisciplines, like behaviorism, in psychology as well as human biology may be distinguished 
by their level of and type of abstraction from direct observation. Of course, human biology also 
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studies phenomena such as hair growth or blood movement, but human biology definitionally 
studies the subject of humans, objects, while psychology definitionally studies the subject of 
human behavior and mental processes, phenomena. Thus, psychology, in comparison with 
human biology, is a more abstract field, when abstract is defined as the distance from direct 
observation with the five senses. All this is not a completely unique observation and similar 
theories have been historically proposed; however, this particular conception of discipline 
demarcation and organization is derived from the framework previously established in this paper. 
Thus, the definition of abstraction here is particularly specific.  
In order to understand how this proposal organizes the disciplines it may be useful to 
imagine a sliding scale of the abstraction of each discipline's primary subjects of study despite 
the original labels of theoretical, observable, objects, and phenomena being discrete. One axis 
would describe the level of abstraction based on inference or how theoretical a subject is, and the 
other axis would describe the level of abstraction based on connection or how physical a subject 
is. Utilizing this scale, one may, as one example of the organization of disciplines by their 
subjects of study, organize the disciplines from least abstract definitional subjects to most 
abstract definitional subjects.  
Another organization system based on subjects is that of the physical hierarchy in which 
each discipline's subjects of study are viewed as constituent parts of the subjects of the discipline 
next on the hierarchy - such that, chemistry underlies biology which underlies psychology which 
underlies sociology. Society, a subject of sociology, is made up of humans, a subject of 
psychology. Humans are made up of organs and cells, subjects of biology, and organs and cells 
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are made up of elements and compounds, subjects of chemistry69. This is simplified and not 
particularly definitional in order to emphasize the point of constituency. This is based on merely 
the observable objects that disciplines study. This organization system is closely related to the 
organization system proposed by Comte who viewed the subjects of scientific study as becoming 
more complex and less generalizable as one traversed a hierarchy from mathematics to 
sociology70.  
The questions of the subjects of study are further complicated among disciplines when 
viewed through the lens of fundamental questions. Take for example, the question of “what is 
life?” This question, most would view, is a question for biology. Biology, in answering this 
question, would need to understand and study not only life and living things, but non-living 
things as well in order to draw the distinction. Thus, it is too narrow to distinguish biology as the 
study of living things. Comparative understanding of scientific practice resists simple 
distinctions based on subjects of study. In this conception, each subject is studied by many 
different disciplines making these subjects poor criteria for demarcating disciplines. 
Illustratively, if one observed a scientist studying a rock, one could not determine whether that 
scientist was a biologist, geologist, physicist, or chemist unless they knew more information 
about the questions being asked.  
Thus, it can be seen that subjects of study are perceived as the simplest and most intuitive 
way to demarcate disciplines from one another; however, the lines often get blurred. It is 
necessary, then, to discuss the other ways in which one might distinguish and organize 
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disciplines and their scientific behavior. The next section will explore the ways in which the 
theories postulated by disciplines may distinguish, categorize, or organize those disciplines. 
What theories do disciplines postulate? 
Through each of the proposed and explored concepts of demarcating science from other 
forms of thought and practices according to scientific theories, one may explore how they would 
impact scientific disciplines differently. As established, most of the strict proposals that are 
largely rejected today were instead taken as normative goals for science to attempt to live up to. 
Thus, one may ask how well different disciplines do at achieving the ideals of proposed 
demarcation criteria. Furthermore, one can see the ways in which proposed criteria have 
impacted the ethos and behavioral practices of science as a whole so it would be likely that each 
discipline will have a unique history with these criteria. It can be interesting to utilize facets of 
these criteria in order to distinguish disciplines from one another, explore the development of 
subdisciplines, and categorize and organize the scientific disciplines. This section will explore 
the proposed demarcation criteria based on scientific theories as they relate to distinct 
disciplines. 
Logical Positivism was as much a movement and a coalition as it was a philosophy. 
There were many thinkers who considered themselves positivists. Specific to the demarcation 
and organization of the sciences, Comte proposed a hierarchy which reflected the speed of a 
particular discipline toward positivism in intellectual history. In Comte’s hierarchy disciplines 
lower on the hierarchy such as Astronomy and Physics moved quickly away from theology and 
metaphysics toward positivist theorizing while disciplines higher on the hierarchy such as 
Sociology moved more slowly away from these less positivist theoretical conceptions. Comte 
believed that eventually Sociology would follow the same path as Astronomy towards a 
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verificationist ideal71.  In this framework, disciplines are organized and demarcated by the 
development of the discipline and its theories through time.  
Popper, in his views on falsification, proposed a kind of continuum of more scientific 
theories to less scientific theories through the concept of making risky predictions. According to 
Popper, theories with greater risk and greater willingness to be proven incorrect are more 
scientific, and theories with lots of self-corrections are less scientific72. This indicates that rather 
than strict demarcation between science and non-science, the theories exist on a sliding scale. It 
follows that one could use Popperian principles to organize the disciplines from the most 
scientific to the least scientific based on the types of theories those disciplines usually propose 
and how risky those theories are. However, there is no definitional component to indicate the 
types of theories a particular discipline will propose. Instead, this scale would likely indicate not 
something fundamental about the disciplines, but instead the amount of influence Popper’s 
proposals have on the practices of each discipline. Once again, this is the normative 
interpretation of falsification. 
Another form or hierarchical organization specific to the conversation of discipline 
demarcation and organization, is that produced by theory reductionism. Theoretical 
underpinning, similar to the physical underpinning previously described, is the basis for the 
construction of this type of hierarchy. A hierarchy which places the disciplines with the most 
fundamental laws, those to which other laws can be reduced, at the most foundational position73. 
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Anderson argues against this form of reductionism, though not necessarily against this 
organization, on the basis that theories from disciplines further from the most fundamental 
position cannot be formulated by the further study of the more fundamental discipline. In other 
words, less fundamental theories are reducible to but not derivable from more fundamental 
theories74. Regardless of the directionality of the connection between the theories, there remains 
a fundamental enforcement of the hierarchy itself. If the theories exist on a hierarchy, the 
disciplines which postulate these theories would therefore exist on the same hierarchy. This 
creates an organization of the disciplines which looks remarkably familiar with physics 
occupying the most fundamental rung of the hierarchy and social sciences occupying the least 
fundamental rungs. However, Anderson’s conclusion about the inability of more fundamental 
theories to derive the less fundamental theories is remarkable in its indications for discipline 
independence. If one cannot derive a chemical theory from a physical theory, as Anderson 
argues, then chemistry is at the very least theoretically independent of physics75. This indicates 
greater divides between disciplines and the necessity of their unique perspective. 
Next, it is interesting to consider the Kuhnian concepts and proposals as they relate to the 
relationship between disciplines. For instance, different disciplines behave differently during 
times of scientific revolution76. It was previously discussed that the choices made in scientific 
revolution reflect the values of the scientific community that makes the choice. Viewing each 
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discipline as a separate scientific community one can see the differences in their priorities and 
values in times of revolution.  
Biology and other life sciences often prioritize explanatory power over predictive power 
while physics and other physical sciences often prioritize predictive power over explanatory 
power77. Thus, each of these disciplines value each of these properties to a greater degree. As a 
result, if a theory in life science is able to explain a previously unexplained question of why, it is 
more likely to be selected in these fields during revolutions. A good example of a prevailing 
theory which had significant explanatory power is that of evolution. Evolution and natural 
selection could explain not what traits a species had, but why a species had those traits indicative 
of a high degree of explanatory power. However, in physical sciences such as physics and 
chemistry predictive power is far more prioritized in the selection of a prevailing theory. 
Evolution does not often attempt to predict future states of species; however, Newtonian 
mechanics, a prevailing theory in physics, was and remains extremely predictive of the objects it 
describes. These disciplines are distinct in the components of a good scientific theory that they 
prioritize as a discipline-specific community and therefore, theories in one discipline are 
remarkably distinct from theories in other disciplines. 
While Kuhn’s work did a lot to expand the disciplines considered to be scientific, when it 
came to theories, it implied that there could be only one accepted paradigm (prevailing theory) at 
a given time in a given discipline. However, this does not account for the specialization nor the 
diversity of particular disciplines. While physics, for instance, has maintained a fairly consistent 
paradigm which attempts to explain all of the phenomena in the scope of the discipline, other 
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disciplines might have several concurrent paradigms. This is why Lakatos’s interpretation has 
more power and may be more appropriate in certain fields with high diversity and specialization 
- Lakatos allowed for more than one research program in a given field. 
Disciplines are distinct from one another in their number of prevailing theories 
(paradigms, research programs) at a given time. Some disciplines are structured with many 
concurrent prevailing theories which work mostly independently while others follow a more 
traditional Kuhnian model with one main theory which is explored by small puzzle-solving 
hypotheses. One could then organize the disciplines based on their theoretical diversity by 
grouping disciplines with high numbers of research programs and disciplines with low numbers 
of research programs. This, of course, could be deeply influenced by the scope of the disciplines 
and the homogeneity of its subject matter. 
Perhaps instead, it is best to consider concurrent prevailing theories as independent 
subdisciplines. Since a given field cannot, according to interpretation of Kuhn, contain more than 
one paradigm, perhaps concurrent paradigms are indicative of distinct disciplines. Each of 
Lakatos’s research programs would then be considered its own discipline7879. Similar to Popper, 
perhaps the colloquial disciplines, as people currently sort them, are more socially defined than 
philosophically consistent. As a result, disciplines and subdisciplines could be better 
conceptualized and demarcated by their theories even if the general sensibilities and university 
departments suggest a lack of independence. 
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After having discussed the concept of goal-based influence on scientific theories, one is 
left to wonder on how this distinguishes different disciplines from one another. For instance, the 
goals of medicine and pharmacology are far more practical than those of biology, chemistry, or 
biochemistry. It follows that these more pragmatic disciplines would postulate far more 
applicable theories about pathology for instance while the more general disciplines would 
postulate theories relating to the gaps in the whole picture of the field. These different goals and 
theory behaviors are unique even when disciplines study very similar subjects. Just as the goals 
of science distinguish it from other behaviors and endeavors, the goals of different disciplines 
distinguish their theories from theories proposed by other disciplines.  
Ziman modeled his theory of industrial science on Merton’s scientific norms and thus 
included a list of normative goals toward which science would strive. These criteria are very 
different than the community and carefully allocated goals in Merton’s theory. These criteria 
represent the main functions of industrial science. Ziman specifically described a list of 
industrial, application-based ethos for science of this variety to uphold. Ziman suggested that 
“industrial science is Proprietary, Local, Authoritarian, Commissioned, and Expert”80. 
Proprietary refers to the lack of sharing of proprietary scientific discovery. Local refers to the 
smaller technical problems that science is called upon to solve. Authoritarian refers to the non-
individualistic managerial system under which science is conducted. Commissioned refers to the 
direct practical problems that science is asked to solve. Finally, Expert refers to the view of 
scientists as expert problem solvers rather than skeptical and curious81.  
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It is unlikely that all sciences are particularly apt for a shift from academic to industrial 
scientific practice – from Merton’s norms to Ziman’s norms, from general to practical – thus 
certain disciplines will be able to live up to the Ziman’s norms better than others. One can view 
the disciplines with pragmatic goals not as applied sciences but as industrial sciences and those 
disciplines with a more general goal as academic sciences according to this model.  
In this exploration of what makes discipline theories distinct, one wonders further about 
the ways in which disciplines and subdisciplines develop and are categorized. Discipline-specific 
theory behavior is one way in which these disciplines might be understood to be distinct; 
however, methods and interpretation may also provide insight into this question of discipline 
demarcation. 
What methods do disciplines use? 
It has been seen that, while maybe not strictly demarcated, disciplines and even 
subdisciplines are distinct in accordance with their subjects of study and theories. It follows that 
the continued exploration of discipline demarcation and organization as it relates to the methods 
employed and the connections with forms of scientific demarcation is likely to yield interesting 
discipline distinctions. Thus, this section will analyze the different methodological beliefs of 
individual disciplines. 
First, the rationalism and empiricism debate has a lot to suggest about each discipline's 
connection with truth and epistemology. Rationalism applied to modern science would only 
include disciplines like theoretical physics, which do not rely on sense experience or data 
collection, as truth82. Take, for example, Einstein's theory of relativity, while it can be said that 
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Einstein was studying the phenomena of time, he was not measuring it directly or even 
secondarily83. It was not until the experimental evidence of relativity was revealed that any 
variables were observed or measured at all and these measures were carried out by arguably a 
different subdiscipline of physics84. Because modern science does not uphold a purely rationalist 
viewpoint, relativity was not fully accepted until empirical data was gathered. Thus, theoretical 
physics may be considered an epistemologically significant activity by the rationalists. The 
rationalists’ belief in truth being derived from rational thought and mathematics would exclude 
most scientific disciplines, including those that provided the empirical evidence of relativity, as 
achieving truth85. In other words, disciplines that are not purely theoretical or mathematical in 
nature would not be considered objective truth by the rationalist. These disciplines, in the 
rationalist view, allow one to perhaps approximate knowledge but not to know absolutely.  
Empiricists applied to modern science would, of course, reject the rationalist notion that 
mathematical or theoretical sciences reflect objective truth. However, while empiricists, in their 
purest sense, did believe that knowledge is derived from perception, they did not believe that 
those perceptions could access objective reality86. Thus, observation-based scientific disciplines, 
too, may also be excluded from empiricists’ view of knowledge. British empiricism, specifically, 
creates an epistemological trap which makes most physical knowledge completely inaccessible. 
However, especially as the logical empiricists took empirical views and made them more 
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practical for scientific application, empiricism has ultimately had a significant impact on most 
disciplines in science aside from purely theoretical disciplines87. Most disciplines require careful 
observation rather than pure rationalism. The logical positivists or logical empiricists would 
likely view theoretical physics as a tool to support experimental physics. It follows that, in this 
view, theoretical physics would not be considered its own scientific discipline as it is not 
grounded in empirical data. Interestingly, this is the first time a criterion has suggested the 
combination rather than the distinction of two disciplines. The philosophy of logical empiricism 
suggests that theory and experimentation cannot be easily separated and made into distinct 
subdisciplines as the debate so far may have one believe.  
Once again, the broad methodological principles definitely have an impact on scientific 
disciplinarity; however, the more implementable and explicit methods and procedures of science 
must also be analyzed. Thus, the next methodological distinction that may apply differently to 
individual disciplines is that of experimental methods versus descriptive methods88. Both of 
these methods are a systematic collection of information; however, they each have unique 
methodologies and logical conclusions. The next few paragraphs will compare between 
controlled experimentation and classification utilizing examples of each method from both 
chemistry and biology. This exploration can shine a light on the ways in which different 
disciplines interact with scientific method. 
It has been discussed that Popper’s falsifiability is more applicable to hypotheses rather 
than broad scientific theories, such as, those controlled experiments with refutable hypotheses 
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that live up more closely to the falsifiability ideal. The methodology of a controlled experiment 
with variable manipulation is attributed to Bacon89. Interestingly, these methods have been used 
across multiple traditional disciplines. Examples from biology and chemistry will help highlight 
the ways in which experimentation is used across disciplines. These examples, in particular, are 
illustrative due to their simplicity. Specifically, Pasteur’s experiment with boiled broth would 
contribute to the disproving of spontaneous generation in biology90 and Boyle’s experiment with 
the elastic properties of air would describe a chemical law for which he was the eponym91. Both 
of these experiments, though existing in different disciplines, relied upon creation of apparatus, 
the controlling of specific variables, and the logic of causation. For Pasteur, contact with the 
open air caused the formation of microbes in the broth. For Boyle, a change in the volume of air 
caused a change in the pressure. Without experimentation, this form of causal logic is widely 
seen as unacceptable. 
Similar to the understanding of experimental methods, descriptive methods can be 
explored using examples from biology and chemistry. Many disciplines employ the use of 
classification, a descriptive method, in order to categorize observable subjects in their field. 
Classification and taxonomy are the practices of organizing and categorizing a set of things 
according to particular criteria92. Classification takes many different forms - some systems 
observe and document subjects as they are found, some perform experiments to determine 
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theoretical properties. Classification can be viewed as pragmatic rather than truly fundamental as 
multiple organizations of the same subjects are accepted as scientifically valid93.  This is distinct 
from the conclusions of experimentation. Disciplines employ and understand classification in 
different ways.  
Thus, in exploring two historical examples of classification, one may observe the 
relationship between classification methods and scientific disciplines. The first example is 
biological taxonomy which is a very old and storied form of classification. Many systems for 
categorizing living things were proposed through this history each based on different criteria 
which were observable at the time. The widely accepted system is that of Linnaeus which 
categorized living things based on certain observable criteria, specifically those he viewed as 
naturally occurring94. Interestingly, the staying power of this classification system is largely due 
to its consistency with evolutionary theory which was proposed later95. The second example is 
elemental organization which has a similar history to biological taxonomy in that it is a system 
based on similar features which held up to a later developed theory. Mendeleev, who developed 
the widely accepted periodic table of elements used today, did not know about the structural 
similarities that would later be proposed96 (specifically, the connection between atomic weight 
and atomic number). Instead, he utilized the known chemical properties of the discovered 
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elements to observe and organize consistent patterns. These examples are very similar in their 
use of classification techniques despite existing in different disciplines.  
Experimental and descriptive methods, as outlined here, are used in many of the 
traditionally defined disciplines, like biology and chemistry. However, once again, it may be 
interesting to consider how these methods may categorize subdisciplines each with methods that 
distinguish them. This form of categorization between experimental and descriptive sciences 
may be useful, despite that chemistry and biology have each been shown to both employ both 
methods. There are some distinctive differences one can observe about these methods and their 
effect on the vector of science. Individual experiments, as one may observe with Pasteur and 
Boyle, generally have a much smaller scope than classification systems. Additionally, 
classification, as one may observe with Linnaeus and Mendeleev, does not, in its original 
methodology, claim causal reasoning. Finally, experiments rely more heavily on methodological 
replicability while classification relies more heavily on repeated observations97. Each of these 
impacts the vector of their disciplines. Thus, the subdisciplines of chemistry and the 
subdisciplines of biology, in this case, which employ these distinct methods may be considered 
separately due to their different methods and scopes. 
Minimizing method, as the post-Kuhnians, especially Feyerabend, did, allowed for a 
more generous view of scientific disciplines. Thus far this paper has mostly avoided discussing 
the political and institutional definitions of science and scientific disciplines which will be 
explored later on; however, it is important to mention that Feyerabend, in his advocacy for the 
elimination of dogmatic methodology98, was also advocating freedom from the narrow views and 
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traditions of establishment science. This is essential to his argument, as it allowed for disciplines 
without institutional backing, perhaps those previously labeled as pseudoscience such as 
alternative medicines, to be considered with a scientific lens99. Feyerabend was radically 
unconcerned with restricting scientific thought believing that scientific heroes would emerge to 
indicate the disciplines that provided the best path forward for knowledge and understanding. In 
this way, the minimizing of method also minimized the distinctions between disciplines. 
Disciplines, in Feyerabend’s conception, existed on a level playing field and each was equally 
likely to produce an important breakthrough. 
Finally, Merton’s theories on the sociological norms of science exclude very few 
scientific disciplines from consideration as science100. However, for these norms to operate a 
community or social group of scientists must exist. Especially for organized scrutiny, peer 
review and reproducibility, a community which understands the technical, as well as the 
philosophical components of the produced science is required. It follows that the smaller this 
peer group the less skeptical power they would have. Therefore, with increased specialization 
and the creation of more subdisciplines, these smaller, more niche disciplines would be less able 
to conduct organized scrutiny. This, once again, suggests that the subdisciplines, so readily 
created based on theory-based criteria, do not have the sociological establishment to be separated 
so easily on the basis of method.  
Disciplines behave differently in their methods and behaviors. Each is distinct in their 
interpretation of and compliance with different methodological criteria. Additionally, logical 
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empiricist ethos and sociological pressures temper the increased specialization of disciplines and 
suggest that broader, more established disciplines maintain their methodological similarities 
better than smaller, newer disciplines. The next section will explore how disciplines engage with 
different scientific interpretations and interpretive philosophies. 
What interpretations do disciplines accept? 
Scientific interpretation, as was previously shown, is an intricate part of the perpetuation 
of science through time. The philosophies which indicate particular ways to interpret science are 
unsurprisingly essential to the analysis of individual disciplines and their vectors.  
The logical positivist attempt to remove metaphysical questions of value, meaning, and 
unobservable phenomena affects disciplines differently. As usual, logical positivism or logical 
empiricism prioritizes physics as a discipline where theories are generally mathematical and 
logical in nature rather than descriptive. This movement prided itself on objectivity, neutrality, 
and universality101. These principles, along with Popper’s conviction that science must accept 
empirical evidence, suggests that scientific interpretation is mostly unnecessary, and science is 
approaching truth with each new theory102. One might organize the disciplines, therefore, by 
where on the journey to objective truth they are in comparison with other disciplines. This is yet 
another way to interpret Comte’s organization of the sciences. Comte viewed the sciences as 
progressing through intellectual history away from metaphysical belief toward truth and each of 
the sciences had a different pace on this progression. The truth of astronomy, for example, would 
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be known earlier than the truth of, say, biology103. This can be viewed as an interpretive 
hierarchy of disciplines and indicative of a vector of science with a very specific trajectory of 
science. 
The concept of theory-ladenness of observation, with its roots in psychology, implies that 
it is the fault of the humanness of scientists104. Humans are fallible in their observations and 
therefore lack strict objectivity. Thus, it is simple to conclude that technology is a resource to 
combat theory-ladenness of observation105. If one can remove the sensory component of 
scientific observation one can curtail the impact of theory-ladenness. From this conclusion, 
disciplines which rely more on detection devices than human observation would need to be less 
concerned about theory-ladenness of observation. One could distinguish and group scientific 
disciplines based upon their reliance on fallible human observation. However, there is some 
evidence to suggest that technology does not eliminate theory-ladenness of observation. As 
previously discussed, detection devices require a theoretical leap in interpreting data as 
unobservable objects are, as Carnap concluded, theoretical106. For example, a device that detects 
electrons relies on the theoretical construct of electrons existing and behaving in a particular 
manner. Thus, at least some of the top-down influences that lead to theory-ladenness remain 
present.  
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It is interesting to consider Kuhnian concepts and proposals as they relate to the 
relationships between disciplines and not just the relationships between paradigms107. When 
using theories to demarcate disciplines, one can view any concurrent paradigms within an 
established discipline as a separate subdiscipline. These subdisciplines may have overlapping 
subjects of study or consider similar questions. Thus, applying Kuhn’s notions of 
incommensurability to disciplines and especially subdisciplines can provide a lot of insight.  If 
paradigms are incommensurable, one is left to wonder if disciplines, with their distinct 
paradigms, are incommensurable as well108. 
Theory-ladenness, though previously discussed, is a Kuhnian type of incommensurability 
known as observational incommensurability109. If disciplines, like paradigms, cannot agree on 
the facts of observation due to their theories, then cross-disciplinary work would be extremely 
difficult. With paradigms, two competing paradigms may observe the same data or observation 
and interpret it in two different ways. Similarly, subdisciplines within a larger discipline are 
more likely to observe the same data or observation and may do so in two different ways because 
of their different prevailing theories.  
In addition to observational incommensurability, Kuhn defined methodological 
incommensurability which may additionally be applied to disciplines in the same way it is 
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applied to paradigms110. This form of incommensurability gives voice to the distinctions 
previously outlined such as those in relation to subjects, theories, and methods. In fact, viewing it 
this way gives possible reasons for the different behaviors across disciplines since prevailing 
paradigms set the standards by which normal science, in a Kuhnian sense, is done. Thus, if the 
values of a particular discipline align most with particular philosophies, then the standards of 
behavior accepted and expected within the discipline will follow those philosophical 
expectations. For instance, since physics has never been traditionally excluded from any 
scientific philosophy, physics is able to maintain values that are somewhat unobtainable for other 
disciplines such as risky falsifiability. However, as sociological views demonstrate, these 
principles are more often applied in the way of expectation rather than strict criteria. Thus, 
normal science in physics may have the greater expectation of falsifiability compared with other 
disciplines. If the differing standards, expectations, and values between disciplines previously 
explored are viewed through this Kuhnian incommensurability framework, one may observe that 
different disciplines, like different paradigms, are somewhat incomparable in their conclusions.  
The third and final type of incommensurability that Kuhn discussed was semantic 
incommensurability. The lexicon of disciplines is significantly diverse and often have very few 
overlapping terms. However, semantic incommensurability implies the necessity of speaking the 
language, as it were, of a prevailing theory in order to understand the interpretation of science in 
that theory. Along this line, disciplines and subdisciplines demarcated by their single prevailing 
theory would utilize different language and semantic structures in their interpretation, and 
translation across these disciplines would require careful consideration of semantic 
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incommensurability. Additionally, the implication of the lack of a universal neutral language into 
which science can be translated is that individual disciplines are more disconnected from one 
another in their interpretation than in, say, their methodology. In other words, two studies could 
be conducted using almost identical procedures, but have semantic incommensurability in their 
interpretive conclusions.  
It may be necessary, at this time, to recall that interpretation is a mechanism for the 
vector of science and for the perpetuation of science through time. The conclusion that one can 
come to with regard to disciplinary vectors of science is that individual disciplines require their 
own independent conception of the vector of science which may look different than the overall 
vector of science. Within this viewpoint, it is likely that the directional next of a vector of 
science would be far more general than the exact experiment or study of an individual 
discipline’s directional next. Furthermore, a particular discipline, like physics, may have a 
trajectory, like fundamental laws describing all phenomena, while other disciplines, like biology, 
may not have a trajectory at all. It can also be seen, through the action of individuals flocking 
toward particular disciplines, which disciplines are the most prolific and therefore have the 
greatest magnitude. As previously introduced, the concept of the vector of science is hardly 
singular as it cannot imply any clear implementable directional next nor be particularly useful in 
describing the future of scientific research. Instead, one may find great success in considering 




Finally, Merton’s sociological view of science has implications for disciplines in their 
interpretation111. Specifically, one can see how individual disciplines live up to the ideals of 
universalism and communality. Universalism, as a disconnect from politics, can act as a 
reminder that the political and monetary systems through which science is conducted must be 
taken into account in the interpretation of science. Sciences, in modern practice, are funded 
through organizations which rely on the traditional, broad disciplines of science with the 
expectation that the values of those disciplines will be applied to the science. One might, because 
of this monetary structure and a belief in universalism, see scientific disciplines as demarcated 
by their means of funding or by their university department. Universalism is the unpacking of the 
political influences in interpretation to reach closer to that objective, impersonal ideal. Merton’s 
next interpretive criteria for science additionally has implications for the demarcation and 
organization of disciplines. Merton believed in the ideal of communality or the free sharing of 
scientific interpretation. Interestingly, the reality of communality or a lack thereof is much more 
complicated. This system usually requires money and connection to access most scientific results 
from prestigious journals. Additionally, these requirements are impacted by the views of journals 
and the predominant disciplines published in those journals112. These usually maintain some 
connection with the traditional, broad disciplines. Once again, one can see that the traditional 
views of disciplines cannot be so readily separated from the behavior of science especially when 
political systems are taken into account. It is important to note, however, that Merton’s view 
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apply mostly to academic science and thus greater understanding of these cultural systems and 
different approaches to scientific practice is necessary. 
Understanding the ways in which disciplines interpret their work, especially ideas like 
incommensurability, directly ties into the vector of disciplines and the nature of interdisciplinary 
work. However, analysis of Merton’s sociological view in accordance with disciplines indicates 
the necessity to address the impact of cultural and political systems on the disciplinarity of 
science. 
Institutions, Politics, and Money 
The conclusion of analyzing the demarcation between disciplines is not surprising. There 
does not seem to exist particular philosophical criteria which distinguish disciplines from one 
another. However, each discipline has a unique relationship with the philosophy of science. 
Science, it is clear, is not a uniform epistemological practice. The broad established disciplines 
are not in themselves homogeneous in their subjects of study, theories, methods, or 
interpretation. Given this conclusion, the easiest answer for the demarcation of disciplines is not 
some philosophical or epistemological concept with necessary and sufficient criteria. Instead, 
disciplines, as they are most often viewed, are the results of institutions, politics, and money. 
Thus far, this paper has avoided talking at length about these more culturally-defined constructs; 
however, for the current question of how disciplines are demarcated and organized it is essential 
to address the institutional categorization of scientific disciplines.   
Science, through its applications and reputation, has a significant impact on society; 
however, the impact of society on scientific practice cannot go unacknowledged. This topic is 
not the main focus of this paper, but it is important to cover certain aspects which specifically 
impact the vector of science and the demarcation of disciplines. First, one may examine the 
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impact of research funding. Second, one may examine the nature of scientific education. Third, 
one may examine the process of scientific dissemination. Finally, one may examine the impact of 
politics and political movements on scientific practice. These analyses will be overviews to 
establish important factors of the question at hand.  
Today’s scientific research is mostly conducted out of research universities and funded 
by government grants. Funding, for the purposes of this exploration, refers to the funds utilized 
for any expense and includes access to necessary equipment and technology. The views of 
universities and even the grants themselves perpetuate and maintain established disciplines. 
Regardless of any changes to a discipline’s subjects, theories, methods, or interpretation, 
universities and other establishments can neatly accommodate small changes without much 
uproar. Instead of establishing subdisciplines based on philosophical criteria, universities create a 
new department when there is a particular demand for one. This is often related to, but not 
entirely defined by, access to equipment and availability of funds. Stichweh discusses the 
discipline specialization and the creation of more subdisciplines as a result of the scientific 
community. Modern universities are, thus, a tool for communication within the scientific 
community and the most convenient way of establishing and communicating the distinctions 
between science and non-science as well as between different scientific disciplines113. 
This is further complicated however when one considers the scientific ethos of Mode-2 
knowledge production. For one, the university is not the only location for prolific scientific 
research and industry and private research can more often live up to the Ziman norms than the 
Merton norms. Second, even with the university system certain elements of Mode-2, despite 
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being essentially post-academic, assert a certain level of influence. Significant to this discussion 
is the consensus that this more practical, proprietary science is more transdisciplinary and lacks 
the institutional entrenchment of established disciplines in its problem-solving pursuit114. 
In addition to funneling and distributing government funding, universities control most of 
scientific education and the training of new researchers in the individual fields115. Reinforcement 
of established rules and procedures within disciplines is not unique to modern universities. These 
behaviors and procedures, perpetuated by universities, are socially defined rather than 
philosophically defined though the two ideas are deeply connected. Regardless of any student’s 
intention to participate in research, curricula are also established with the disciplinary structures 
in mind. Disciplines, at universities, are defined as much by research and research training as by 
education itself. Thus, these two constructs are inherently linked. It would be prudent to 
distinguish between a department and a discipline. Departments are university constructs which 
often hold the same titles as disciplines. Disciplines are much broader than universities but tend 
to be driven by the departments116. Professors at universities are often asked to do research as 
well as educate; however, not all students within a department are training to become researchers 
in that discipline themselves, especially in disciplines which have specific and direct real-world 
applications. Of course, there are some geographical and hierarchical dependencies. So, 
remaining focused on American universities and undergraduate curricula in particular, one can 
see that many students in the department of biology, for instance, are not intending to become 
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biological researchers. With this fact in mind, curricula, which are defined by the department, are 
based on both the current research, values, beliefs, and procedures of a particular discipline as 
well as the possible career paths of the students within the department. The relationship between 
departments and disciplines is bidirectional. While the research values and behaviors do impact 
department curricula117, the curricula also impact the research behaviors118. This relates directly 
back to the concept of the goals of science or of a particular discipline impacting the research 
that is conducted. If education is focused on the applied careers in the particular field, then the 
goals of research may skew in the direction of applicability and thus may be more greatly 
impacted by Mode-2 expectations. Scientific research is, in the current university system, 
inextricably linked to scientific education.  
Scientific dissemination also has an impact on the conversations thus far; it relates 
directly to the demarcation of science and the demarcation of disciplines. Stichweh, in addition 
to recognizing the communicative nature of universities, recognized that the establishment of 
journals, which related to specific disciplines, could also indicate the scope and role of those 
disciplines119. Modern journals utilize peer review to systematize the scrutiny of the community 
of scientists disseminating their work. In other words, peer review allows the community to 
determine where, in an established system, specific scientific behaviors belong disciplinarily120. 
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This is of course a rather post hoc view of discipline distinction but is nevertheless notable in its 
ability to harness the community. Additionally, national and international organizations that 
establish rules about discipline specific dissemination and behavior also influence the behaviors 
of scientists. For example, the American Psychological Association not only established a 
democratized governing body for the psychology discipline, but also established a publication 
format for articles121. This format dictated specifically the acceptable way to disseminate work 
within psychology. These journals, governing bodies, and communities of scientific authors 
established both the similarities of scientific dissemination and the discipline distinctions.  
Finally, the questions about scientific and disciplinary thought as well as the ongoing 
practice of science has been impacted by historical events, political turmoil, and the personal 
politics of individual scientists and thinkers. Science has never been particularly apolitical. These 
political entanglements represent the imperfect implementation of Merton’s scientific norms. For 
instance, the logical positivist movement, which has been discussed at length, began in Vienna; 
however, the political unrest, racism, and imminent conflict that was World War II led most 
logical positivists to flee Germany122. One thinker, Schlick, was even murdered by a student for 
political reasons123. These political factors disrupted the community and consensus building that 
the movement had previously possessed. Other thinkers and scientists were also impacted by 
politics external to the scientific community even in science unconnected with university 
scholarship. Take for example, the US Superconducting Supercollider which was defunded by 
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congress. Debates on the very nature of science and knowledge were conducted in front of 
congress and ultimately, the politics of non-scientists determined the fate of that scientific 
project124. The external politics and events may not dictate as strictly the distinctions between 
disciplines; however, these factors affect how, when, and with what motivation science is done. 
These external factors, thus deeply impact the vector of science.  
Conclusion 
The socially and culturally defined structures as well as the external circumstances make 
a difference to the question of discipline distinction and more broadly the function of disciplines 
in science. It is easy, after the discussion of discipline demarcation, to suggest that the vector of 
science is most impacted by the political and cultural structures that directly drive the practice of 
science. However, this would ignore the significant entrenchment of philosophical beliefs on 
scientific behaviors. Consequently, the vector of science and future scientific behavior is 
impacted by the philosophy of scientific inquiry, the philosophies of particular disciplines, and 
sociopolitical factors.  
As no clear criteria for distinguishing disciplines is forthcoming, each discipline engages 
in very different activities and maintains thoroughly unique philosophical values. One might 
even say that these disciplines are incommensurable. Thus, the question that is left is how do 
these different disciplines and subdisciplines interact with one another considering the challenges 
of incommensurability. In a conclusion and culmination of the explorations thus far, this paper 
will analyze the ways in which science might transcend, accept, and engage with disciplinarity. 
Disciplines, it seems, are here to stay and while their function may not be clear, their importance 
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to the perpetuation of science is undeniable. If the future of scientific research is 
interdisciplinary, what would this research look like? The final section will explore the vector of 
science through the lens of interdisciplinarity and the ingrained beliefs about the function of 





The question central to this paper has been exploring the function of disciplines within a 
scientific system. The exploration of the demarcation of science itself and of the disciplines it 
contains is an important precursor to understanding the function of disciplines and of the 
placement and integration of interdisciplinary work within that system. Throughout this paper 
the structure that has been used to compare and describe science and its disciplines is that of 
subjects, theories, methods, and interpretation. This structure was chosen for its concise and 
comprehensive view of the behaviors of traditional science. This structure contains within it both 
the very abstract, philosophical components of scientific practice and the concrete, historical 
behaviors of scientific practice.  
These explorations reflect a wide-angle lens approach to the problem at hand and the 
conclusions are thus broad. Science is something of a socially defined practice with many of its 
ethos tied to but not defined by specific behaviors and beliefs. The function of disciplines within 
a scientific system remains an elusive conclusion being similarly described by its philosophical 
ethos. However, the exploration of both science and disciplines is enlightening with regard to 
interdisciplinary research. Interdisciplinary research faces many challenges because of the ways 
that science and scientific disciplines are constructed. Scientific disciplines, without careful 
understanding of the philosophical divides, are rarely able to address the differences in their 
subjects, theories, methods, and interpretation. To combat deep philosophical and metaphysical 
divides between disciplines in their pursuit of interdisciplinarity, as shall be shown, the 
disciplines might work on their comparability, parity, and synergy to be more philosophically 
aware in interdisciplinary pursuits. The perpetuation of science through time, the vector of 
science, is influenced and driven by the philosophical and social behaviors of science as each 
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experiment, belief, controversial thinker, and political influence impacts the science that will be 
done next and on through time. Thus, the disciplinarity of science has a significant impact on the 
vector of science. 
This paper explores the inherent and historical disciplinarity of science and its connection 
with interdisciplinarity moving forward. However, only so much of the debates and discussions 
can be explored. Therefore, further research into the function of disciplines in science would be 
prudent, especially with regard to any institutional and political proposals based on achieving 
disciplinary functionality. Additionally, more research is needed on the logistical and practical 
aspect of implementing philosophically aware interdisciplinary research125.  
Philosophically aware interdisciplinary research is the conclusion of the philosophical 
complexity previously discussed. As is well-established at this point, disciplines are remarkably 
distinct. While occasionally they have similar features from which they can be categorized, the 
prevailing conclusion is that disciplines have their own unique subjects, theories, methods, and 
interpretation. This is both the result of a lack of consensus surrounding what is considered 
scientific behavior at all and the unique relationships each discipline has with the philosophy of 
science. Furthermore, disciplines are divided by political, traditional, and financial factors. Even 
within traditional disciplines, there are aspects of distinction which separate the work further into 
subdisciplines. Scientific disciplinary behavior is often dependent on how each discipline 
incorporates the beliefs of historical thinkers and movements. Additionally, one can wonder 
about ideological entrenchment which would only enhance the divides between disciplines.  
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The main goal of this paper is to highlight the significant differences and hierarchies 
between disciplines. The organization of these disciplines and the beliefs that hierarchies create 
change the dynamics between disciplines. The only implementable solution for interdisciplinary 
or transdisciplinary research addressed in this paper has come from the Mode-2 knowledge 
production126. However, with this conception comes other expectations which are not connected 
to the disciplinarity or interdisciplinarity of the work, such as a focus on the practical application 
and a lack of cooperative sharing of findings and knowledge. Furthermore, due to the integration 
of the beliefs into the university, institutions and educational entrenchment of disciplines still has 
an impact on the behaviors of scientist even as expert problem solvers. The discipline training, 
beliefs, and biases are still present in individuals even when the approach itself is 
transdisciplinary. It seems that there should be a possibility for interdisciplinary research that 
could still exist within the academic space and could, regardless of its driving mode, unpack and 
utilize the disciplinarity of individuals and systems.  
Comparability, Parity, and Synergy in Interdisciplinarity 
Based on the explorations and conclusions of the preceding discussions, the following 
framework for interdisciplinarity in the academic space that honors individual biases and 
perspectives is proposed. This framework will contain many normative beliefs and assertions 
about interdisciplinary research. Additionally, the following paragraphs will give more specific, 
contextual definitions of words that are colloquially defined including comparability, parity, and 
synergy in order to structure these normative assertions. Kuhn’s incommensurability, applied to 
individual disciplines, suggests that disciplines do not observe the same reality, value the same 
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questions, or speak the same language which would make their cross-sectional work particularly 
challenging127.  Interdisciplinary research is complicated, delicate, and multifarious128. There are 
many ways to achieve interdisciplinarity without compromising the strides and contributions of 
individual disciplines. The principles of comparability, parity, and synergy are an assertion about 
possible perspective steps to effective interdisciplinary research based on the philosophical and 
behavioral divides between scientific disciplines outlined in this paper. These three words 
represent concepts that are interdependent and build upon one another. Thus, one would need to 
start with comparability in order to achieve parity and synergy. As stated, this is a possible 
framework for interdisciplinarity based on the philosophical understanding of disciplines 
established thus far. 
Comparability is the understanding of the differences in philosophy, values, and 
behaviors between disciplines and the understanding that scientific disciplinarity creates limited 
perspectives. Disciplines are comparable when each discipline's unique and individual 
perspective is understood by the other disciplines. Comparability would be, for example, the 
understanding of incommensurability between disciplines which are generally perceived as 
requiring effortful deconstruction of differing philosophies, methods, and language. Each of the 
categories would also need to be addressed in comparability – the subjects, theories, methods, 
and interpretation – and how these factors differ and intersect. Additionally, as evidenced by the 
educational connection, disciplinarity is incorporated into not only the practice of science, but 
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into the training of scientists129. This training is one example of the creation of a limited 
perspective. Scientists are trained within their discipline and imbued with the beliefs and values 
of that discipline. Comparability is achievable through understanding a limited perspective and 
the differences between one’s particular perspective and another’s. Comparability is just one 
factor which would help combat the incommensurability and deep divides between disciplines. 
Parity is the mutual respect and perceived equality between the differing perspectives of 
scientific disciplines. Parity represents a fundamental belief that though a particular scientific 
behavior may differ from one’s own behavior, neither behavior is superior or more scientific 
than the other. This stems from the belief that there is no consensus on what defines science, and 
that each discipline interacts with the philosophy of science differently. Popper, for example, 
may indicate a hierarchy from more scientific practices to less scientific practices; however, 
rigidity to this belief would stifle parity between disciplines130. Parity is the belief that all 
disciplines have limited and equally valuable contributions to interdisciplinary science. 
Furthermore, parity indicates the acceptance, within the critical necessity of the scientific 
community, of the results of other scientific disciplines despite philosophical differences. 
Anderson, in his criticism of theory reductionism, addresses the concept of parity. Anderson’s 
argument suggests that, because of their unique, underivable contributions, none of the 
disciplines can really be considered more fundamental than any other131. Parity also asserts that 
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no scientific discipline is fundamental, and the unique contribution of each discipline should be 
taken as equally valuable to scientific discourse and to interdisciplinary research. 
Synergy is the act of cooperation between disciplines in interdisciplinary research after 
achieving comparability and parity. This may be the most complex step as it requires specific 
decisions on the subjects, theories, methods, and interpretation that will be used in the 
interdisciplinary work. Synergy with the precursors of comparability and parity would indicate 
that those decisions would be made from a philosophically and disciplinarily informed place. 
Synergy also indicates that interdisciplinarity does not operate in isolation. A single discipline 
cannot effectively engage in interdisciplinary research without consulting and collaborating with 
other disciplines as there would be inadequate comparability and parity. This is due to the limited 
perspective of individual disciplines. Thus, the choices of synergy are achieved through 
collaboration with comparability and parity between the collaborating disciplines. Synergy is the 
final act of collaboration itself and the closest thing in this framework to a truly practical 
implementation. Thus, this is where most of the recommended future study lies – in the practical 
pursuit of collaborative synergy. 
These factors that contribute to achieving interdisciplinary research are derived from the 
deep divides between disciplines and the lack of consensus about what constitutes scientific 
behavior. Interdisciplinarity is a tremendously popular idea in science, and it is unlikely that 
careful attention is being paid to philosophical and behavioral divides, to limited perspectives, 
and to hierarchical entrenchment. Of course, there are still practical, logistical concerns with 
interdisciplinary research especially within modern political and institutional systems. However, 
the philosophical challenges cannot go unacknowledged. 
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The Vector of Interdisciplinary Science 
The vector of interdisciplinary science is tough to discern. The implications of the 
proposed interdisciplinary factors just discussed are interesting as they relate to the vector of 
science.  
As previously discussed, the conclusion that one can come to with regard to disciplinary 
vectors of science is that individual disciplines require their own independent conception of the 
vector of science which may look different than the overall vector of science. To stretch the 
metaphor perhaps too thin, it may be interesting to view interdisciplinarity as the unique 
mathematical relationships between two vectors. It is well established that simple addition of 
constituent parts is insufficient for interdisciplinarity so would interdisciplinarity look more like 
the addition of two vectors. When two vectors are summed both the magnitude and direction will 
be affected not wholly independently from one another. As stated, this may be stretching the 
metaphor a little over its limit especially as these are not mathematical entities, but it does 
highlight the ways in which the vector of interdisciplinarity is more complex than even the 
summation of disciplinary vectors. 
This highlights the necessity of exploring the magnitude and direction of the vector of 
interdisciplinarity separately. The magnitude is the energy, prolificacy, and Lakatosian 
progression with which the science is being pursued. This paper began with the assertion that 
interdisciplinarity was the hot topic in scientific communities; everyone is interested in doing 
interdisciplinary scientific research, but not everyone is showing particularly interesting 
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interdisciplinarity132. Thus, it seems that magnitude or at least the demand for interdisciplinary 
research is remarkably strong. 
Next it is important to explore both factors for the direction of the vector of 
interdisciplinarity: the directional next and the trajectory of interdisciplinarity. For 
interdisciplinary research, the directional next would be based on the chosen elements from 
synergy and would be directly related to the structures and dynamics of the collaboration. The 
choices made for research subjects, theories, methods, and interpretation would depend on how 
well individual scientists have integrated the beliefs of comparability and parity into their 
professional beliefs. For instance, if a scientist maintains a belief about the exceptionalism of 
physics in comparison with other sciences, they have not completely integrated the principles of 
parity. As a result, this scientist would likely choose to pursue a directional next answering their 
interdisciplinary question with physics-based methods and values. Thus, the vector of science 
would more directionally match the vector of physics. Of course, this example describes the 
impact of only one scientist and as stated, successful synergy is based in collaboration between 
multiple scientists with unique disciplinary backgrounds. However, each scientist’s beliefs are 
relevant to the interdisciplinary choices they make and to the subsequent directional next.  
Furthermore, there has been examples that interdisciplinarity in the past has followed the 
same principles as subdisciplinarity. Often, successful interdisciplinary fields become their own 
disciplines as the chosen procedures and beliefs become widespread and standardized enough to 
be categorized133. This is an example of how individual choices for the directional next and their 
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impact on the vector of interdisciplinary science imply a long-term trajectory of interdisciplinary 
science. By valuing disciplinarity and standardizing certain beliefs and behaviors, one sees a 
trajectory of interdisciplinary science where work that is now interdisciplinary will one day be an 
independent discipline. One is left wondering whether these new disciplines, born from 
interdisciplinarity, will be indistinguishable from other disciplines or if some factor will mark 
them as uniquely interdisciplinary. Furthermore, is the subdisplinization of interdisciplinary 
work as positive trajectory for continued interdisciplinarity?  
The vector of interdisciplinary science is unique in its reflection of the interconnectedness 
of disciplinary values. As more disciplines formulate and pursue interdisciplinary questions and 
thus tackle the philosophical and perspective challenges with interdisciplinary work, it is likely 
that new implications for the vector of science will be revealed. The unique quality of 
interdisciplinary work and collaboration is the ability for unforeseen and novel ideas to emerge 
from the intersections of those disciplinary vectors. Thus, the conclusion is that the vector of 
interdisciplinary science is to a certain extent unpredictable as true pluralistic collaboration is 
particularly variable. This is why exploration of interdisciplinarity is useful as a culmination and 
conclusion to the disciplinary exploration that this paper has achieved. Disciplinarity in science 
is the basis, the mechanism, and the framework of interdisciplinary research. 
Sign Off 
As science continues to change and grow, it is important to take a step back and address 
the broad philosophies, behaviors, and expectations that drive scientific practice. Especially as 
one thinks of the continuation of that practice on through time. One is left to wonder of 
predicting the future. What will be uncovered next? What technological advances will be 
invented? Where will science go and will it recognize itself as it goes?  
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Predicting the future is an impossibility that one may spent a lifetime tackling because is 
it not just so science to spend a lifetime tackling an impossibility. The vector of science is an 
instantaneous and delicate metaphor, but it serves as a reminder that the direction that science 
faces now is not the same direction it has always faced nor is it the direction it will come to face. 
The slightest action can change the direction of the vector of science and throw more uncertainty 
into predicting the future.  
It is humbling to remember that one will almost certainly be incorrect in their prediction 
of the future, but it is empowering to know that the slightest impact, the smallest discipline, and 
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